


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Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar

THE MORAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY DURING THE PANDEMIC IN HUNGARY

Introduction

Coronavirus. This word has completely rewritten, interwoven and transformed our economy, social relationships, work-life, education system etc., so basically our whole lives. It required an incredibly quick adaptation from everyone; however, its effects on our lives were far from even. While a number of infections and deaths have weighed on the country's population, a number of new fault-lines have emerged along social strata, accumulated goods, types of work and settlement differences, during which a more fortunate part of society has survived the pandemic relatively easily in a locked down, self-isolating, working or learning online situation, while the situation of low-income, disadvantaged social groups was further exacerbated by the epidemic.

In catastrophes, economic crises and epidemic situations when the infrastructures and operating mechanisms of the state and the markets come to a standstill for a while, a “vacuum of action” suddenly arises, in which certain social groups and activities are simply “forgotten” by society or by decision makers; their problems almost disappear, and they don't even get as much attention as they do in a non-disaster situation. These groups tend to coincide with social groups who, already in a difficult financial situation, have little opportunity to make their voices heard, whose savings or assets are either completely absent or very low in volume. They have the least opportunity to present their problems to decision makers and then get concrete help.

Many social groups were left out of the concepts of decision-makers during the coronavirus crisis in Hungary, therefore they were even more affected by the epidemic. At state level, no substantive social policy, education policy or health policy was made for them, and in addition, one type of social benefits (public works) was even reduced. Contrary to the practice of other European Union member states (Germany or the United Kingdom), the Hungarian state supported the middle class rather than disadvantaged social groups. There is no question that helping disadvantaged Hungarian citizens should have been a state task but, as this did not happen, in many cases citizens organised it by themselves or were organised through mutual assistance networks or by non-governmental, civic organisations.


¹ Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics

A number of formal and informal shopping communities, mutual lending companies, relief funds, and volunteer-based bottom-up assistance programmes have been launched, all aimed to solve the acute problems that already existed at the outbreak of the coronavirus. These practices all fit into the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the solidarity economy or human economy, as well as the moral economy.

However, because of the extreme diversity of these practises, the present paper focuses only on a small slice of these entities. In this article, I analyse the community funding of the programmes launched by non-governmental organisations on the fundraising platform most used by Hungarian NGOs, (Adjukössze “Put Together” <https://adjukossze.hu/>), and within this only those that managed to collect the most funds, between March 4, 2020 and May 27, 2020. in every main coronavirus category (<https://adjukossze.hu/koronavirus>).

In my paper, I adjusted this to the number of active infections attributed to the epidemic. As one can see from the curve below (Diagram 1), the first person infected by COVID in Hungary was recorded in the official statistics on March 4, 2020. The curve then started to rise sharply and then, on April 4, 2020, the epidemic peaked in the country. Then the curve showed a continuous decrease trend until May 27, 2020, which is the closing date of my data. On May 27, 2020, the epidemic did not end in Hungary. At that time, 1436 people were registered as actively infected (yellow area), 1856 people had recovered from the disease (blue area) and, 505 people passed away during the epidemic (red area), according to the official statistics.

Diagram 1: Changes in the number of active coronavirus cases in Hungary, recovered and deceased




Source: <https://atlo.team/koronamonitor/#Graphics> (27/05/2020)

I am looking for the answer to the following questions: what trends can be observed in Hungary in the fundraising, donation part of the programmes, given the challenges of the coronavirus, on the largest fundraising platform in Hungary? Furthermore, to what extent have these campaigns strengthened or weakened each other? Who provided financial assistance and to what extent? To what extent did the intensities of these collections coincide with the epidemic curve, and to what extent can they be explained by other factors, such as changes in the volume of COVID internet searches?

Donation, solidarity economy and NGOs

If we stop for a moment and disregard the official statistics related to the epidemic, and look at the intensity of the population in Hungary during the study period, the internet search for coronavirus and related keywords have a completely different curve² (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2: Hungarian searches for the Coronavirus search term (02/18/2020 -27/05/2020)




Source: Google Trends, <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2020-02-18%202020-05-27&q=Koronav%C3%ADrus> (May 27, 2020)

It can be clearly seen that the part of the population that has access to the Internet was informed about the pandemic (22/02/2020) long before the first infected person was registered in the official statistics. As a result, we see a jump in the trend as early as February – due to news from China – and from the beginning of March we can see a continuous rise with two maximum points (March 16, 2020 and March 21, 2020) and then the volume of searches decreases continuously.

2 The days with the highest number of searches for the given term are marked with 100 points on the chart, and the additional points on the curve are determined to that extent.

If we transform the infection curve and the internet search curve, we can see that two completely different event-horizons took place over time (Diagram 3). While the public attention turned to the epidemic mostly in mid-March after a very rapid upswing (orange curve), the infection curve (blue curve) began to rise much later and then reached its maximum point in May with a one-month lag. Nothing shows the difference between the two curves better than being negative and extremely weak Parsons correlation (-0.137) between them.

Diagram 3: Curves of Web searches, and COVID infections (04/03/2020–/27/05/2020)



Where does this discrepancy come from? There are, of course, a huge number of factors involved in this, ranging from the introduction of state restrictions on leaving home to health measures to the flow of information, but now, without claiming to be exhaustive, I would only focus on one. I would like to highlight the effects of solidarity and the human economy, as well as civic activism, among the many explanations.

Solidarity economy, human economy, or moral economy practices are usually intensified in social crisis situations. This is when the collective reactions of the population, which can respond to economic and political crises when social rights are violated and the economy or the state is unable to provide effective solutions, take on a different, alternative, critical model. In many cases, these activities emerge not only as economic activities, but also as civic participation, participatory democracy, or as new practices of governance and advocacy³ that can range widely from adaptation to autonomy.

A rich academic literature has been emerged in recent decades in French, Spanish, and English about the solidarity economy, human economy, the third sector, or

3 Kousis M. - Paschou M. (2017): ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF ESILIENCE A typology of approaches for the study of Citizen Collective Responses in Hard Economic Times, PACO, Issue 10 (1), 136-168

about the moral economy. The concept of a solidarity economy was coined by Luis Razeto, a Chilean philosophy professor, and has become a central concept of one of the oldest functioning civic movements in Latin America ever since.⁴ However, these economic concepts are far from new. Moulaert and Ailenei trace these alternative economic practices all the way back to ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and also point out that they have been observed throughout the entire human history.⁵ Thus, we can find examples in mediaeval European cities, the Byzantine Empire, Muslim countries, India, Africa and North America. However, they only become widespread on a broader social level, at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries in response to socio-economic crises, exploitative economic relations, and mass impoverishment caused by the Industrial Revolution.⁶ The associations, cooperatives or other alternative / socio-economic structures were formed at that time and they were institutionalized at the beginning of the 20th century and were simultaneously influenced by the 18th-19th century utopian socialism and ideologies of Christian democratic and liberal movements.⁷ In the aftermath of World War II, another wave of these economic forms emerged, this time responding to the crisis of the mass production system in the 1970s with the creation of a new, alternative movement that included participatory and ecological ideologies, the Schumacherian idea of “Small Is Beautiful” and the local development systems. These socio-economic practices first flourished in France and Latin America, and then solidarity movements began to emerge in the United Kingdom, the United States, Africa, and in many countries in Asia. Its latest wave of solidarity structures has emerged as a response to the 2008 global financial crisis and the response to rapidly growing inequalities.⁸

The concept of the solidarity economy is spread over an extremely wide constellation, and the concept of solidarity itself is even more diverse. It may include mechanisms of taxation and state redistribution, charity, donations, altruistic contribution and political support, social policy, redistribution of social benefits, financial funds, social enterprises, and NGO programmes.⁹ As a result, the practices associated with it are also widely implemented,

4 Ould Ahmed P. (2014), “What does ‘solidarity economy’ mean? Contours and feasibility of a theoretical and political project”, *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 24 (4): 425-435.

5 Moulaert F. and O. Ailenei (2005), “Social Economy, Third Sector and Solidarity Relations: A Conceptual Synthesis from History to Present,” *Urban Studies*, 42 (11): 2037-2053.

6 Moulaert F. and O. Ailenei (2005)

7 Defourny J. and M. Nyssens (2012), “Conceptions of Social Enterprise in Europe: A Comparative Perspective with the United States” in B. Gidron and Y. Hasenfeld (eds.), *Social Enterprises: An Organizational Perspective*, London: Palgrave MacMillan.

8 Piketty T. (2015), *The Economics of Inequality*, Harvard: Harvard University Press; Almeida P. (2007), “Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America,” *Latin American Perspectives*, 34 (3): 123-139.; Kousis M. and C. Tilly (2005), “Introduction”, in M. Kousis and C. Tilly (eds.) *Economic and Political Contention in Comparative Perspective*, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

9 Simonič P. (edit) (2019): *Anthropological perspectives of solidarity and Reciprocity*, Lju-

and they methods can also take many forms. They may be exchanges based on solidarity¹⁰, local trading systems (LETS)¹¹, local money¹², ethical banks¹³, local market cooperatives¹⁴, alternative forms of production¹⁵, critical consumption movements¹⁶, housing and anti-eviction civic initiatives¹⁷, resistance and spontaneous actions of financial recovery¹⁸, or even new donation practices¹⁹, and the list can be continued with many more.

As the number of studies on these alternative citizenship initiatives increases, so does

-
- bljana, Znanstvena založba Filozofske Fakulteta universal v Ljubljani
- 10 Fernández MM (2009), “El trueque solidario: Una estrategia de supervivencia ante la crisis argentina de 2001”, *Revista Pueblos y Fronteras digital*, 4 (7): 5-29.
 - 11 Granger RC, J. Wringe and P. Andrews (2010), “LETS as Alternative, Post-capitalist Economic Spaces? Learning Lessons from the Totnes ‘Acorn’,” *Local Economy*, 25 (7): 573-585.
 - 12 Seyfang G. and N. Longhurst (2013), “Growing green money? Mapping community currencies for sustainable development”, *Ecological Economics*, 86: 65-77.; Schroeder RFH (2013), “The Financing of Complementary Currencies: Risks and Chances on the Path to Sustainable Regional Economies”. The “2” International Conference on Complementary Currency Systems (CCS) 19-23 June 2013, The Hague.
 - 13 Cowton CJ (2006), “Financing the social economy: a case study of Triodos Bank,” *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing*, 6 (2): 145-155.; San-Jose L., J. Retolaza, and J. Gutierrez-Goiria (2011), “Are ethical banks different? A comparative analysis using the radical affinity index.” *Journal of Business Ethics* 100 (1): 151-173.
 - 14 Phillips R. (2012), “Food Cooperatives as Community-Level Self-Help and Development,” *International Journal of Self Help and Self Care*, 6 (2): 189-203.
 - 15 Corrado A. (2010), “Chapter 2: New peasantries and alternative agro-food networks: The case of Réseau Semences Paysannes”, in A. Bonanno, H. Bakker, R. Jussaume, Y. Kawamura and M. Shucksmith (eds.), *From Community to Consumption: New and Classical Themes in Rural Sociological Research. Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 16: 17-30.
 - 16 Fonte M. (2013), “Food consumption as social practice: Solidarity Purchasing Groups in Rome, Italy,” *Journal of Rural Studies*, 32: 230-239.
 - 17 Fominaya CF and AM Jimenéz (2014), “Transnational diffusion across time: The adoption of the Argentine Dirty War ‘escrache’ in the context of Spain’s housing crisis”, in D. della Porta and A. Mattoni (eds) *Spreading protest: Social movements in times of crisis*, Colchester: ECPR Press.; Nez, H. (2014), “Practices of Social Solidarity and Economic Alternatives in Times of Crisis: The “Network of Social Rights” of Carabanchel, Madrid,” paper presented at the 8th ECPR General Conference, Session 007 Citizens’ Resilience in Times of Crisis, Panel 231: Changing Interactions between Publics and Policies in Times of Crisis, 3-6 September 2014, University of Glasgow, Glasgow; Romanos E. (2014), “Evictions, petitions and escraches: Contentious housing in austerity Spain”, *Social Movement Studies*, 13 (2): 296-302.
 - 18 Dalakoglou D. (2012), “Beyond Spontaneity: Crisis, Violence and Collective Action in Athens,” *City*, 16 (5): 535-545.
 - 19 Barkin D. (2012), “Communities constructing their own alternatives in the face of crisis,” *Mountain Research and Development*, 32 (S1): 12-22. Lamont M., JS Welburn, and CM Fleming (2013), “Responses to Discrimination and Social Resilience Under Neoliberalism: The United States Compared,” in PA Hall, M. Lamont (eds.) *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

the number of theoretical approaches.²⁰ However, an important feature of forms of the solidarity economy is that they prioritize resilience “which involves dynamic processes that promote positive adaptation in the context of significant disadvantages”²¹. Additional goals of the solidarity economy included to reform failed, stagnant economic and political systems, through the development of collective resilience and participatory systems and to promote participatory democracy and civic cooperation, and also to broaden social activism in both economic and political terms.²² These economic initiatives therefore create a new type of political and social actions, a bottom-up participatory structure that promotes and lays the foundations for an economy of solidarity. Solidarity economic approaches thus highlight the importance of bottom-up alternative initiatives and practices based on cooperation and reciprocity, and prioritise strengthening social capital over economic capital gains.²³ In the economy of solidarity, a number of theoretical directions have emerged, all of which place different emphasis on each of the quartet of the individual, the economy, society and the environment.

The human economy focuses on human “well-being” which includes all human needs.²⁴ Thus, it not only includes those needs that can be met by private market transactions with economic activities, but also, for example, security, a healthy environment, and intangibles such as dignity that cannot be reduced to purely quantifiable economic transactions. According to human economy theorists, we are living in an era where market mechanisms (which have always been the result of social fabrication and have never been processes that are controlled by an “invisible hand”) have been extended to new segments with the goal of increasing economic efficiency.²⁵ At the same time, people have realised that treating new social segments as goods (e.g., improving the economic efficiency of the education market) is neither morally nor socially independent of the norms themselves. As a result, human economy theorists are sceptical about economic evolutionary models based on the concepts of efficiency and abstract individual rationality, and rely more on a broader concept of the economy that also takes into account material, historical, social, cultural, and environmental factors.²⁶ In the human economy, the focuses are on individuals whose preferences and decisions are sometimes based on rational calculations, but generally stem from a family, social, and political context.²⁷

20 Kousis- Paschou (2017)

21 Walsh, F. (2015), *Strengthening family resilience*. Guilford Publications, 4.

22 Murray K. and A. Zautra (2012), “Community resilience: Fostering recovery, sustainability, and growth,” in M. Ungar (ed.) *The Social Ecology of Resilience: A Handbook of Theory and Practice*, New York: Springer; 340.

23 Moulaert and Ailenei (2005)

24 Hart K.- Laville JL - Cattani A. (Edited) (2010): *The Human Economy*, Cambridge Polity Press

25 Hann C. - Hart K. (2011): *Economic Anthropology - History, Ethnography, Critique*, Cambridge Polity Press

26 Hann C. - Hart K. (2011)

27 Hann C. - Hart K. (2011)

The assumptions of the moral economy are based on similar fundamentals, which are summarised in the theses of James Scott²⁸. Scott demonstrates, following the example of villages in Southeast Asia, that the basic mechanisms of action and transactional schemes that operate an economy are based primarily on ethical, moral principles rather than profit maximization based on individual rationality. Consequently, this trend questions the axioms of neoliberal economics.

From all this, it can be seen that donation, as will be discussed in this article, is embedded in an extremely broad social and economic theoretical conceptual framework, and it represents only a small practice within. Of course, with regard to donation, the elements forming solidarity economy that have been listed above are also realised because the donor relinquishes his assets for the benefit of another party during the donation, in order to promote moral and ethical goals. However, the process does not necessarily promote a bottom-up process based on reciprocity, but rather via a programme by an intermediary (non-governmental organization, NGO). As a result, it is far from being able to create as much social and economic change as other methods embedded in a solidarity economy, and can sometimes even run counter to the goals of a solidarity economy, as it can strengthen dependency or conceal unequal power relations. As a result, donation is one of the peripheral elements of the solidarity economy, which can be most closely associated with classical economic transactions that are only indirectly related to the reforms of “real” social power relations.

However, in order to be able to analyse the mechanism of donation in Hungary, we also need to give a brief overview of the dilemmas related to NGOs. With the decline of state involvement, the organisational concept of “civil society”, the “third sector” has been strengthening in many countries of the world since the 1970s. However, after the turn of the millennium, with the emergence of mass grassroots movements, the novelty of classical civil, non-governmental organisations is fading, and it has come under fire and strong attacks in many countries. NGOs have recently been the subject of a number of criticisms that their dominant view (“doing good” in difficult situations) is steadily losing legitimacy. This can be traced back to their “magical power,” under which their custodianship of the remedy for social problems and developmental dilemmas has also dissipated.²⁹ At the same time, in addition to critical voices, in many cases there are still many academic writings highlighting the importance of NGOs, pointing out their extreme diversity, both in terms of their activities and their structure. NGOs can effectively represent social campaigns in an institutionalised framework, and they can generate new ideas and approaches in development problems.³⁰

28 James C. Scott (1976): *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, Yale University Press

29 Bebbington A. (2005): Donor-NGO relations and representations of livelihood in nongovernmental aid chains, *World Development*, vol. 33, issue 6, 937-950.

30 Hart K.- Laville JL - Cattani A. (Edited) (2010)

In summary, the conceptual framework of donations is determined by the theoretical framework of the solidarity economy and the operational practices of it by NGOs as intermediaries. This framework however includes ambivalent and sometimes contradictory concepts of interpretation of these entities.

Methodology

The data used for the analysis came from the “Adjukössze”, which is an online fundraising platform. The data was formatted using a Web scraping code written in Python: with this technique, it was automatically possible to access a large set of information from the website, to analyse the donors, the amounts donated, and the days on which the amounts were donated. As the data change in real time on the platform, they were analysed from March 3, 2020 to May 27, 2020. On May 27, 2020, a total of 31 fundraising campaigns were running on the platform, during which the organisations would have liked to raise a total of HUF 44,035,000 and on that day HUF 18,865,682 had been raised so far (<https://adjukossze.hu/koronavirus>). It is also important to emphasize, from a methodological point of view, that not all ongoing campaigns were analysed in this paper, only those that had collected the most funding in each of the 9 main categories. In addition, a campaign can run on the interface for up to 31 days, so similar campaigns for a similar purpose launched by the same organisation during the epidemic have been added together. Each programme had extremely noble goals; some of them promoted the digital education of disadvantaged children; another aimed to solve the housing problems of homeless people; another campaign helped to feed stray dogs; another helped actors who had lost their jobs due to the pandemic; and, another provided assistance to victims of increased domestic violence due to the epidemic³¹.

The epidemic data for Hungary were derived from the Covid19 database (COVID-19-data) containing official world statistics, from which only those statistics that were limited to Hungary and within the time period of the analysis were used. Internet searches in Hungary were provided by a web application called Google Trends³².

Transformations between variables and descriptive statistics were made from all these databases using the SPSS 23v statistical software, and quadratic regression analyses were also performed with it. The use of Quadratic Regression Analysis was supported by the fact that this method was able to provide the best fitted parabola to the data, using the least squares method.

Finally, network data and statistics were created using the Gephi software; with its help, it became possible to analyse the donation relationships both statistically and visually.

31 For all the campaigns included in the analysis, see Table 1 in Appendix

32 Google Trends : (ONLINE: 30/05/2020): <https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?-date=2020-02-18%202020-05-27&q=Koronav%C3%ADrus>

Results – What can we see from the data?

The 9 most successful donations in the 9 main categories on “Adjukössze” came from the donations of almost 2,000 people, but their distribution varies greatly across the categories. The most donors donated to the animal protection programme (39.7%), followed by the education programme (19.8%), the cultural programme (13.3%), and the faith programme (12.9%). These 4 programmes represent 85.7 percent of the total donors in the sample (Table 1).

Table 1: The distribution of donors along categories (20/03/2020 – 27/03/2020.)

Programme	Number of donors	Percentage distribution
Animal protection	771	39.7
Culture	258	13.3
Education	385	19.8
Faith	251	12.9
Environmental Protection	29	1.5
Health	44	2.3
Legal protection	95	4.9
Social	80	4.1
Sports	27	1.4
TOTAL	1940	100.0

In the period between March 20, 2020 and March 27, 2020, 1940 donors donated nearly HUF 17.5 million in total to the programmes, which is scattered along the categories on a wide scale in terms of its distribution, volume and average values (Table 2).

Table 2: Donation amounts by category (HUF)

Programme	N	Sum	Min.	Max.	Median	Average	Std. dev
Animal protection	771	4,788,895	300	100,000	4000	6,211	7,298
Culture	258	3,009,896	1000	350,000	5000	11,666	25,028
Education	385	4,613,000	500	150,000	5000	11,982	19,062
Faith	251	2,120,400	500	100,000	5000	8,448	10,466
Environmental Protection	29	270,000	2000	50,000	5000	9,310	10,202
Health	44	630,000	2000	300,000	5000	14,318	44,384
Legal protection	95	663,500	1000	30,000	6000	6,984	6,665
Social	80	1,202,001	1000	200,000	10000	15,025	25,583
Sports	27	132,400	2000	15,000	4000	4,904	3,003
TOTAL	1940	17,430,092	300	350,000	5000	8,985	16,517

The table shows that half of the total donation amount (53%) was collected by two programmes; an animal protection programme which provided food for stray dogs on the one hand, and an educational programme on the other, which provided access to digital education for disadvantaged children. However, in terms of the number of donors, the health programme as well as the social programme performed the best in terms of donations. Understandably, we see large differences along the minimum donation and maximum donation amounts; however, the median and mean values, with the exception of a few small outliers, show broadly similar donation averages. The median value was HUF 5,000 and the average value was around HUF 10,000 throughout the programmes. All this shows that the donation amounts were put together from extremely small amounts of donations. This is also supported by the distributions of large amounts of donors.

Although it is relatively difficult to draw a limit on what counts as a large donation, it can be applied as a rule of thumb – and consistent with the descriptive statistics – that we do not make a big mistake when considering donors who donated HUF 100,000 or more to a programme as large donors (Table 3).


Table 3: Distribution of large donors by programmes

Programme	Donors	Large Donors	Percentage of large donors
Animal protection	771	1	0.13
Culture	258	3	1.16
Education	385	10	2.60
Faith	251	1	0.40
Environmental Protection	29	0	0.00
Health	44	1	2.27
Legal protection	95	0	0.00
Social	80	2	2.50
Sports	27	0	0.00
TOTAL	1940	18	0.93

Based on this, an extremely small proportion of all donors, about 1% (18 people, 0.93%), fall into this category. If we take a look at their distribution along the programmes, we can see there were no large donors at all in a third of the programmes, however, it can also be seen that there were 3 programmes (Education, Health, Social) where the proportion of large donors exceeded 2% and even almost reached 3%. However, this is still representing an extremely small proportion of all donors, which means that the programmes have raised their donations from an extremely large number of people and from extremely small amounts of donations.

An interesting descriptive statistic is obtained by comparing anonymous (Anonymous³³) donors with donors who give their name, and by looking at the gender distribution of those donors who give their name (Diagram 4).

Diagram 4: Distribution of anonymous and non-anonymous donors by gender



It can be seen that, at the total donor level, that about half of the donors gave their name to the donation and half remained anonymous. It is important that the proportion of women donors is dominant, almost twice as much as the percentage of male donors. If cross-tabulate the results by the programmes, we get Table 4³⁴.

Table 4: Gender and anonymous distribution by programme (%)

	Animal.	Cul.	Edu	Faith	Env.	Health	Legal.	Soc.	Sport
Male	7.9	25.2	20.3	17.5	13.8	15.9	5.3	13.8	3.7
Female	40.2	24.0	32.5	27.5	37.9	31.8	42.1	31.3	44.4
Anonymous	51.9	50.8	47.3	55.0	48.3	52.3	52.6	55.0	51.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It can be seen that each programme's profile is quite similar to the total; about half of the donors are shrouded in anonymity and we cannot detect any outliers along this. In the gender ratio, on the other hand, a slightly higher proportion of male donor participation can be seen in the culture and education programme, and an even lower proportion of male participation, along the categories of human rights, animal protection, and sports.


With regard to donations, it is worth briefly addressing the topic of how many donors

33 Although Anonymous means anonymous donor, it also has another meaning in Hungary, as historians call King Bela III's clerk as Anonymous who lived at the turn of 12th and 13th centuries and who wrote the Gesta Hungarorum (Vajay 1998).

34 The value of chi2 of the crosstab is 87,374 at a significance level of 0.000

can be linked to a particular programme, and what is the overlap between the donors of different programmes. The network and basic statistics of the 9 programmes are shown in Figure 1 and Table 5³⁵. Each node in the network represents a donor, and node-connections are indicated by edges between the nodes.

Figure 1: Donors Network



5. Table: Basic network statistics

Nodes	909
Edges	925
Network density*	0001
Modularity	8
Average path length	1493
Number of connected components	1

* The number of actual edges divided by the number of potential edges

It is clear from both the figure and the network statistics that the network itself has a rather low density (0.001) which means that a given donor usually donates to one specific programme. The number of donors who have donated to more than one

35 The network diagram only shows non-anonymous donors.

programme is extremely small, only 1.5% (14 out of 909). All of this, of course, may be due to the fact that the network only displays those who have donated with their names; we have no information on anonymous donors, and they represent about half of all donors. However, based on these data the entire network can break down into well-separated clusters along the programmes. What is interesting about the network is that even this small number of people donating to multiple programmes are enough for an entire network to emerge between the programmes, and the structure does not fall apart into separate subnets.

The same lack of cross-donation appears in a case where we compare not completely different but completely identical programmes instead. During the coronavirus, two almost identical programmes ran on the platform; both collected donations to promote digital education for disadvantaged children. The network of donors of these two programmes is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Donor network of two similar educational programmes




The network is characterized by 281 nodes, 283 edges, and the density of the network is 0.004, which is very strongly consistent with the data measured on the large network. There are also very few (0.7%) cross- or multiple donations across the network.

From all this, it can be seen that each programme and campaign has its own support base, which can mobilise separately within the framework of a possible fundraising campaign. The overlaps between these donors are minimal, whether we are looking at different programmes or identical ones.

The time series distributions of donations along the programmes are summarised in Diagram 5. It can be clearly seen that the donation curves of the programmes show completely different time series distribution. The animal protection, the social programme, and the education programme responded quite early, in March, to the problems caused by the epidemic, while in other categories, fundraising campaigns were launched only from mid-May.

Diagram 5: Time series distributions of donations (20/03/2020 to 20/05/2020)



It is evident from Diagram 5 that the donation intensity of the programmes was highly variable, producing a large amount in the first 3-6 days after the start of the campaigns, and then further outbursts can be observed along the curves for each communication event or news. However, on average, there were 2-3 days in the programmes when a significant amount of money flowed into the campaign; the rest of the campaign was slightly scattered around the average of the given campaign.

If we compare the curve of the epidemic and the curve of Internet searches with the donation curves of the programmes, we get Diagrams 6 and 7.

Diagram 6: Curve of the epidemic (number of active infected cases, red colour) and curves of the programmes





Diagram 7: Curve of the internet searches (red colour), and curves of the programmes



It is striking both in the epidemic curve (Diagram 6) and in the Internet search curve (Diagram 7) that both described a very different line than any other donation curve. It can be clearly seen with regard to the epidemic curve that donations started much earlier than the number of active infected people started to increase, and they showed outstanding values even after the number of infected people decreased. The internet search curve shows a slightly different picture, where it can be seen that donation programmes started with a strong delay, almost 1 month later, than the search curve would have started to rise sharply. However, donations remained much more intense, regardless of the flattening of the search curve.

The same results can be obtained by analysing the data by quadratic regression. Neither the epidemic curve nor the Internet search for either programme has a statistically

significant R for the models (Appendix Table 2). Based on this, the programmes and the two explanatory curves were completely independent from each other statistically. In other words, they did not affect each other in a statistical sense. Here, in a statistical sense, we should stop analysing the data, but it is still worth moving a little further, even if the R value of the models are not significant, and take a look at the ANOVA and coefficient values (Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix). Based on the results of the ANOVA, it can be seen that sport as well as faith programmes show significant results with the Google search curve (at the 0.05 level), but we cannot observe such correlation with the epidemic curve. With regard to the coefficients there are even less significant cases, only one case, with respect to the culture which has a value that is statistically significant.

So, what can we see from all this? In particular, it takes time to develop programmes that respond to specific coronavirus problems. That is the explanation for the difference that can be seen between Internet searches and the start of donations. A programme needs to be set up, the associated activities need to be organised, which has resulted in a delay of about 3-4 weeks depending on how the population has begun to detect the outbreak. It can also be seen that these programmes are mostly multiplied when the epidemic curve is halfway through flattening. All of this means that with the exception of a few early but even more successful birds, most of the programmes only started when the epidemic was over, and could only mitigate the consequences of the epidemic.

Conclusion

Based on the analyses, it can be seen that the Hungarian society was completely unprepared for the pandemic, both socially and economically. Those social groups who have so far been excluded from the horizons of decision-makers have become even more marginalised because of the coronavirus.

The few programmes that Hungarian NGOs were able to launch at about the same time as the outbreak happened, were only a few drops in the sea of “problems, and only a relatively small number of donors gave donation to them in terms of the total population of the country. This resulted, on the one hand, from the information vacuum in which the Hungarian NGOs are stuck, and on the other hand, the lack of resources in the segment, and the fact that almost every NGO campaign has its own support base, with very little inter-connections between them, and these support bases can only provide extremely fragmented and sporadic donations.

It can also be seen that organisations and the population begin to realise the current nature of social problems when the epidemic is already passing, so at best, the participation of citizens can only mitigate the social and economic problems in the wake of the epidemic. This is shown by the fact that the curves of donations and the epidemic or information curves were almost completely independent from each other.

Although with regard to donation we see a weak attempt which move towards to strengthen the Hungarian solidarity economy, the high proportion of anonymity

among supporters and the relatively small volume of support and the small size of the Hungarian civil sector do not allow us to interpret it as the appearance of a new human-centred economic mechanism at the macro level. However, it is known that society will not become democratic unless we find a way to democratize and reform the economy. Donation is a very small step in this direction, and the lessons from this paper shows that a next possible epidemic wave in the future will still have a negative impact and strongly adverse effects on the lives of marginalized social groups if the decision-makers do not pay attention to them.

Appendix

Table 1

Category	Organisation	URLs
Health	Hospital School Foundation to Support the Learning of Sick Children	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/online-tanitjuk-az-orvosok-apolok-gyerekeit-a-korhazsuliban-1951
Animal protection	Ant Community	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/elelemhiany-a-menhelyeken-1905
		https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/hivj-meg-ebedre-egy-kutyat-1994
Social	From Street to Apartment! Association	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/segits-az-ule-nak-atveszelni-a-koronavirust-veszhelyzetet-1894
		https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/segits-az-ule-nak-atveszelni-a-koronavirust-veszhelyzetet-1937
Culture	Independent Performing Arts Association	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/tamogassuk-az-eloado-muveszeti-teruleten-dolgozokat-1896
		https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/tamogassuk-az-eloado-muveszeti-teruleten-dolgozokat-1954
Faith	Society of Jesus Foundation	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/minosegi-kozvetitestehnikat-a-jezus-szive-templomba-1973
Environmental Protection	Pangea Cultural and Environmental Association	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/kutatok-a-jovo-termeszetbuvaraiert-1920
Education	Civil College Foundation	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/ablak-a-padra-legyen-a-digitalis-oktatas-mindenkie-1922
		https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/ablak-a-padra-digitalis-eszkozokat-a-raszorulo-gyerekeknek-1992
Sports	Downdog Yoga Studio Association	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/tamogass-hogy-jogzhas-jogazz-hogy-tamogass-1989
Legal protection	Emma Public Benefit Association	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/zold-utaz-anyaknak-1971
Education	Resource Foundation United Way Hungary	https://adjukossze.hu/kampany/orthon-iskolat-minden-otthonba-1952

Table 2 - Quadratic Regression Models - Model Summary

Variables	Programmes	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Changes in the number of Internet searches	Animal protection	206	, 043	019	16.963
	Health	135	, 018	- 006	11.933
	Faith	361	130	109	13.289
	Legal protection	246	.060	, 037	17.692
	Culture	279	, 078	, 055	13.442
	Education	250	, 063	, 040	16.419
	Sports	436	191	171	21.629
	Social	207	, 043	, 020	16.836
	Environment protection	201	, 040	, 017	14.605
Changes in the number of active infections	Animal protection	215	, 046	, 023	16.929
	Health	, 078	.006	- 018	12.006
	Faith	131	, 017	- 007	14.126
	Legal protection	192	, 037	013	17.914
	Culture	197	, 039	015	13.724
	Education	359	129	107	15.831
	Sports	137	019	- 005	23.814
	Social	, 058	003	- 021	17.180
	Environment protection	226	, 051	, 028	14.523

Table 3 - Quadratic Regression Models - ANOVA

Variables	Programmes	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Changes in the number of Internet searches	Animal protection	1047.514	2	523.757	1,820	168
	Health	215.130	2	107.565	755	473
	Faith	2165.796	2	1082.898	6.132	003
	Legal protection	1649.095	2	824.548	2.634	, 078
	Culture	1250.163	2	625.081	3.459	, 036
	Education	1479.259	2	739.629	2.743	, 070
	Sports	9028.232	2	4514.116	9.650	, 000
	Social	1043.376	2	521.688	1,841	165
	Environment protection	734.992	2	367.496	1.723	185

Changes in the number of active infections	Animal protection	1143.556	2	571.778	1,995	143
	Health	72.095	2	36.048	250	779
	Faith	284.509	2	142.254	713	493
	Legal protection	1002.947	2	501.473	1.563	216
	Culture	624.085	2	312.042	1,657	197
	Education	3034.798	2	1517.399	6.054	.004
	Sports	884.621	2	442.311	780	462
	Social	81.864	2	40.932	139	871
	Environment protection	931.430	2	465.715	2.208	116

Table 4 - Quadratic Regression Models - Coefficient Values

Variables	Programmes	Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. error	Beta		
Changes in the number of Internet searches	Animal protection	556	320	818	1,737	,086
	Health	-039	225	-082	-172	863
	Faith	-543	251	-971	-2,165	,033
	Legal protection	-191	334	-267	-572	569
	Culture	667	254	1,214	2,630	,010
	Education	-029	310	-043	-092	927
	Sports	-1,279	408	-1,355	-3,132	002
	Social	230	318	340	722	472
	Environment protection	118	276	201	426	671
Changes in the number of active infections	Animal protection	422	245	415	1,720	,089
	Health	115	174	163	662	510
	Faith	160	205	192	784	435
	Legal protection	458	259	428	1,763	,082
	Culture	313	199	382	1,576	119
	Education	503	229	506	2,193	,031
	Sports	154	345	109	446	657
	Social	131	249	130	525	601
	Environment protection	434	210	497	2,064	,042